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AARON

I.

Foreign Sovereign Inununities Act

Foreign states are presumptively immune from suit and their property
presumptively immune from attachment and execution, unless an exception
in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) applies.'

A.

GENERAL EXCEPTIONS

In Atlantica Holdings, Inc. v. Sovereign Wealth Fund Samruk-Kazyna JSC,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
denial of a Kazakhstan sovereign wealth fund's motion to dismiss on
sovereign immunity grounds.2 The court held that the FSIA does not
immunize an instrumentality of a foreign sovereign against claims that it
violated federal securities laws by making misrepresentations outside the
United States concerning the value of securities purchased by investors
within the United States. The court found that the "direct-effect clause" of
the commercial activity exception to immunity, Section 1605(a)(2) of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, was satisfied where the effect of the
securities fraud-plaintiffs loss-occurred in the United States, at least

&

* This Article summarizes developments in international litigation during 2015. The article
was edited by Aaron Marr Page, managing attorney at Forum Nobis PLLC in Washington,
D.C. Jonathan I. Blackman and Carmine D. Boccuzzi, partners at Cleary Gottlieb Steen
Hamilton LLP in London and New York, respectively, authored Section I and VII, with
assistance from James Blakemore and Elizabeth Block, associates at the same firm. Theodore J.

Folkman, a shareholder at Murphy & King in Boston authored Section II. Phillip B. Dye, Jr., a
partner at Vinson & Elkins L.L.P. in Houston, Texas, authored Sections 171 and VIII, with
assistance from Liane Noble and Page Somerville Robinson, associates at the same firm.
Matthew D. Slater, a partner at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP in Washington, D.C.,
authored Section IV, with assistance from Caroline Stanton and Robin Rabinowitz, associates at
the same firm. Howard S. Zelbo, a partner at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP in New
York, authored Section V, with assistance from Paul Kleist, an associate at the same firm. Igor
V. Timofeyev, Charles A. Patrizia, and Joseph R. Profaizer, partners at Paul Hastings LLP in
Washington, D.C., authored Section VI and IX, with assistance from Sabin Chung and Peter S.
Larson, associates at the same firm.

1. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976).
2. Atlantica Holdings v. Sovereign Wealth Fund Samruk-Kazyna JSC, 813 F.3d 98 (2d Cir.
2016).
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where the securities were marketed in the United States and "the defendant
contemplated and acted to encourage investment by United States persons."3
In Arch Trading Corporationv. Republic ofEcuador, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by
several entities claiming that the Republic of Ecuador and two of its
instrumentalities unlawfully seized their property in Ecuador. The entities
claimed that this conduct fell within the FSIA's "expropriation" exception in
Section 1605(a)(3).4 The court held that the exception did not apply where
plaintiffs alleged only that entities affiliated with government
instrumentalities engaged in commercial activity in the United States.
Plaintiffs' allegations did not overcome the presumption of separateness laid
out in Bancecs because they did not allege that the instrumentalities
themselves exercised significant and repeated control over the day-to-day
operations of the distinct, non-governmental entities.6 As a result, the
commercial activity of the non-governmental entities could not be imputed
to the instrumentalities and did not destroy the immunity afforded to
Ecuador and its instrumentalities.

B.

EXECUTION EXCEPTIONS

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh and Ninth Circuits
have split in two decisions analyzing the scope of FSIA's "terrorism"
exception in Section 1610(g). In Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, victims of
terrorism sought to satisfy their multi-million dollar default judgment
against Iran by executing on several collections of ancient Persian artifacts
located in the United States.7 The Seventh Circuit rejected plaintiffs'
argument that Section 1610(g), added in 2008 to ease "the collection process
for victims of state-sponsored terrorism by eliminating the Bancec rule that
foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities are treated separately for
execution purposes," is itself a "freestanding exception to execution
immunity."8 Thus, a plaintiff that seeks to execute on property pursuant to
Section 1610(g) must still satisfy a Section 1610 exception to execution
immunity, e.g., the commercial activity exception. But in Bennett v. Islamic
Republic oflran, the Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that subsection (g) does
contain "a freestanding provision for attaching and executing against assets
of a foreign state or its agencies or instrumentalities," and that once plaintiffs
had satisfied Section 1610(g), they were free to execute on the judgment
debtors' United States property.9
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 110-11.
Arch Trading Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, 839 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2016).
First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983).
Arch Trading, 839 F.3d at 201-207.
Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 481.
Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 825 F.3d 949, 959 (9th Cir. 2016).
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In Kirschenbaum v. 650 Fifth Avenue and Related Properties, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed a lower court grant
of summary judgment on terrorism victims' turnover actions, by which the
victims had sought to satisfy their judgments by seizing properties held by
companies allegedly linked to Iran.IO The court found that the company
from which turnover was sought did not bear the attributes of statehood and
therefore could not be equated with Iran." Additionally, they were not
agencies or instrumentalities of Iran because the New York-based entities
were United States "citizens" under § 1603(b)(3).12 And there was no
evidence that Iran exercised day-to-day control over the companies as would
be required to treat them as alter egos of Iran.13 The court allowed that on
remand, the plaintiffs could seek to establish facts proving that the
companies were agencies or instrumentalities of Iran under the separate
definition in the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act and that the properties were
"blocked assets" subject to execution under that Act.14
II.

International Service of Process

International service of process is governed by Rule 4(f) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which allows for service (A) "by internationally
agreed means," such as the Hague Service Convention; or (B) "by a method
that is reasonably calculated to give notice;" or (C) "by other means not
prohibited by international agreement, as the court orders."15
In 2016, several courts grappled with Russia's refusal to execute requests
for service of process under The Hague Service Convention16 and its
objections under Article 10 of the Convention to the use of alternate means
such as postal service. In Delex Inc. v. Sukhoi Civil Aircraft Co., the plaintiff,
Delex, served process on a Russian defendant, Sukhoi, by registered mail and
by personal delivery to the head of its foreign activity legal support
department. Both methods were authorized by the state of Washington's
corollary to Rule 4.17 The Washington Court of Appeals held that the
service was valid despite Russia's position on postal service, finding that
10. Kirschenbaum v. 650 Fifth Ave. & Related Properties, 830 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2016).
11. Id. at 124-25.
12. Notably, the court indicated that a U.S.-based partnership could still qualify as an agency
or instrumentality because "Congress has 'never expanded [its] grant of citizenship to include
artificial entities other than corporations."' Id. at 125-28. But this analysis did not affect the
partnership at issue in the case because the argument was not pursued on appeal. Id.
13. Id. at 128-30.
14. See id. at 131.
15. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
16. The ostensible reason for Russia's refusal is a dispute about whether the U.S. practice of
charging a flat fee for the central authority's private contractor is consistent with Article 12. See
Hague Service Convention, arts. 10, 12, Nov. 15, 1965, U.S.T. 361. The Special Commission
of the Hague Conference on Private International Law has rejected Russia's position several
times, most recently in 2014, but the dispute remains unresolved. Id.
17. Delex Inc. v. Sukhoi Civil Aircraft Co., 372 P.3d 797, review denied, 385 P.3d 114 (2016).
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because Russia's refusal to execute requests "renders service under the
Hague Convention impossible... [Delex] must be allowed to serve [Sukhoi]
through alternative means."18 By contrast, in Fisher v. Petr Konchalovsky
Foundation, the court rejected a motion under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(f)(3) for leave to serve by mail based on Russia's objection to
postal service. 19 The Fisher court took the position that the Conventionand Russia's objections to it-remains effective notwithstanding Russia's
intransigence regarding execution of service requests. But the court went on
to authorize service by email, relying on questionable precedents holding
that the Convention does not forbid service by email. Nevertheless, Fisher
and Delex are plainly at odds about the effect of the Russian position on the
Convention.
A background issue left open in both cases is the customary international
law governing the effect of breaches of a multilateral treaty. The Delex court
held that the Convention was ineffective vis a vis Russia without a formal
U.S. withdrawal because there was no mechanism for the United States to
"abrogate the [Convention] with respect to Russia but leave it in force with
the [over sixty] other signatories."20 But under customary international law,
"[a] material breach of a multilateral agreement" generally entitles "a party
specially affected" to suspend the operation of the agreement with respect to
the "defaulting state."21 On the other hand, to suspend the operation of a
treaty, the United States would have to take some formal action of
notification,22 which the United States has not done.
United States courts also continued to be divided about the permissibility
of postal service under Article 10 generally. A minority of courts, which
focus on Article 10(a)'s use of the word "send" rather than "serve," continue
to hold that service of process by mail is not authorized by the Convention.
For example, the Texas Court of Appeals rejected the validity of postal
service in Menon v. Water Splash, Inc.,23 perhaps following the lead of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.24 But in Mutual
Benefits Offshore Fund v. Zeltser, a New York intermediate court of appeals
overruled its own precedent to allow for postal service, the position likewise
supported by the United States Department of State, the Special
Commission of The Hague Conference, and all other State Parties to the
Convention.25 A petition for certiorari has been filed in Menon, and in
18. Id. at 802.
19. Fisher v. Petr Konchalovsky Found., No. 15-CV-9831, 2016 WL 1047394 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 10, 2016).
20. Delex, 193 Wash. App. at 372.
21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TI-IE FOREIGN RiLATIONs LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 335(2)(b) (1987).
22. See id. § 337(1).
23. See Menon v. Water Splash, Inc., 472 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2015,
pet. filed).
24. See Nuovo Pignone, S.p.A v. Storman Asia M/V, 310 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2002).
25. Mut. Benefits Offshore Fund v. Zeltser, 140 A.D.3d 444, 37 N.Y.S.3d 1 (N.Y. App. Div.
2016).
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September 2016 the Supreme Court of the United States called for a
response to the petition.26 So, 2017 may be the year when the long-standing
split in authority on this issue is resolved.

m.
A.

Personal Jurisdiction
GENERAL JURISDICTION

In 2016, lower courts continued to apply the Supreme Court of the
United States' 2014 decision, Daimler AG v. Baumann, which states that
general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation is proper only when a
corporation's affiliations with the forum state are so "continuous and
27
systematic" as to render it "essentially at home" in the forum state. Courts
consistently declined to exercise general jurisdiction outside of Daimler's
paradigmatic forums: the defendant's place of incorporation and principal
place of business.28
But courts remain split on whether a defendant who is not "at home" in a
forum state may nonetheless consent to a general jurisdiction by complying
with that forum state's business registration statute. In Brown v. Lockheed
Martin Corporation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that a defendant's business registration in the forum state did
not constitute consent to jurisdiction because the statute did not "contain
express language alerting the potential registrant that . . . it would be
agreeing to submit to the general jurisdiction of the state courts."29 The

&

Second Circuit also reasoned that Daimler "suggest[ed] that federal due
process rights likely constrain an interpretation that transforms a run-of-themill registration and appointment statute into a corporate 'consent'perhaps unwitting-to the exercise of general jurisdiction by state courts."30
Other courts have decided similarly, based both on Daimler and on the
language of the particular registration statute.3' But in Bors v. Johnson
Johnson, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held that consent to personal jurisdiction under the
26. Menon, 472 S.W.3d 28.
27. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 746, 763 (2014).
28. See Chavez v. Dole Food Co., Inc., 836 F.3d 205, 223 (3d Cir. 2016); Best Odds Corp. v.
iBus Media Ltd., No. 14-16235, 2016 WL 3924386, at *1 (9th Cir. 2016); Patterson v. Aker
Sols. Inc., 826 F.3d 231, 234 (5th Cir. 2016).
29. Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 630 (2d Cir. 2016).
30. Id.
31. See Display Works, LLC v. Bartley, No. CV 16-583, 2016 WL 1644451, at *7 (D.NJ.
Apr. 25, 2016) (holding that business registration did not constitute consent and that older cases
reaching the opposite conclusion "cannot be squared with . . . Daimler"); In re Zofran

(Ondansetron) Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 1:15-CV-13760-FDS, 2016 WL 2349105, at *4 (D.
Mass. May 4, 2016) (finding no consent to jurisdiction, reasoning that "[a]s with the
Connecticut statute at issue in Brown, the Missouri statute does not mention consent to

personal jurisdiction"); and Aclin v. PD-RX Pharm. Inc., No. 5:15-CV-00561-R, 2016 WL
3093246, at *8 (W.D. Okla. June 1, 2016) (declining to exercise general jurisdiction on the basis
of registration).
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Pennsylvania registration statute remained valid after Daimler because
"Pennsylvania's statute specifically advises the registrant of the jurisdictional
effect of registering to do business."32 Similarly, in In re Syngenta AG MIR
162 Corn Litigation, the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas found that the defendant had consented to jurisdiction by registering
to do business because the "Kansas Supreme Court has already interpreted
the statute to require consent to general jurisdiction, . . . making it no
different than if the Court were faced with a statute that explicitly requires
consent."33
Until recently, this split in authority was nowhere more pronounced than
in Delaware, where different courts considering the same registration statute
reached different conclusions. Last year, the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware issued two conflicting opinions on the issue.34
This year, when the Federal Circuit had the opportunity to address the
conflict, it declined to do so, instead basing its opinion on specific
jurisdiction grounds.35 But in 2016, the Supreme Court of Delaware decided
Genuine Parts Company v. Cepec, concluding that "[iln light of the U.S.
Supreme Court's clarification of the due-process limits on general
jurisdiction in Goodyear and Daimler," Delaware's registration statute
provided a means for service of process but not for consent to general
jurisdiction.36
More broadly, until the issue is decided by the United States Supreme
Court, lower courts and state courts will continue to variably interpret the
provisions of the states' different business registration statutes in light of or
perhaps in spite of Daimler.
IV.

The Act of State Doctrine

The Act of State Doctrine is a prudential limitation on the exercise of
judicial review requiring United States courts to decline to pass judgment on
the validity of official acts of a foreign state performed in its own territory.37
32. Bors v. Johnson & Johnson, No. CV 16-2866, 2016 WL 5172816 at 4* (E.D. Pa. Sept. 20,
2016).
33. In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., No. 14-MD-2591-JWL, 2016 WL 2866166, at
*1 (D. Kan. May 17, 2016).
34. See AstraZeneca AB v. Mylan Pharm., LLC, 72 F. Supp. 3d 549, 555-56 (D. Del. 2014);
Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 572, 588-91 (D. Del. 2015).
35. Acorda Therapeutics Inc. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 817 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
36. Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 148 (Del. 2016).
37. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964); Credit Suisse v.
U.S. Dist. Ct. For the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 130 F.3d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1997); W.S.
Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int'l., 493 U.S. 400, 409 (1990) (doctrine
"requires that, in the process of deciding, the acts of foreign sovereigns taken within their own
jurisdictions shall be deemed valid"); Salem Fin., Inc. v. United States, 786 F.3d 932, 955 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (doctrine does not apply when court need not adjudicate validity of foreign state's
act).
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WITH COMITY

In In re Vitamin C Antitmst Litigation, Chinese vitamin C suppliers sought
dismissal of an antitrust suit brought by United States purchasers on the
basis of an alleged conflict between Chinese law, which required defendants
to set prices and reduce quantities of vitamin C sold abroad, and United
States law, which prohibits such agreements between competitors.38
Plaintiffs argued that there was no true conflict because defendants had
petitioned the Chinese government to adopt the laws at issue.39 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that once Chinese law
was established through evidence provided by the Chinese government, the
act of state doctrine barred plaintiffs' efforts to impugn the law by inquiring
into "the underlying reasons and motivations for the actions of the foreign
government."40 The court went on to hold that principles of international
comity required dismissal on jurisdictional grounds.4'
B.

EXTRATERRITORIAL RECOGNITION

The act of state doctrine does not always require that a United States
court give effect to a foreign government's sovereign acts when those acts
purport to have effect outside the foreign sovereign's territory. In Villoldo v.
Castro Ruz, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit refused
to allow judgment creditors of Cuba to execute on property in the United
States that Cuban law purported to expropriate.42 The court declined to
depart from the extraterritoriality exception where allowing plaintiffs to
execute on the property would be contrary to the express wishes of the
executive branch, hamper United States foreign policy by preventing the
United States government from using the assets in ongoing negotiations
with Cuba, and frustrate Congressional sanctions by permitting a flow of
currency from the United States to Cuba.43
Conversely, in Federal Treasury Enterprise Sojuzplodoimport v. Spirits
InternationalB. V, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
gave effect to a foreign government's decree assigning all of its interests in a
United States trademark. Because it "was a wholly intragovernmental
transfer of rights" that did not purport to alter anyone else's rights or
interests, and addressed "a question of Russian law decided within Russia's
borders, rather than a matter of United States law with a situs in the United
38.
39.
40.
F.2d
41.
42.
43.

In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2016).
Id. at 191-92.
Id. at 191 (quoting O.N.E. Shipping Ltd. v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 830
449, 452 (2d Cir. 1987)).
Id. at 194-95.
Villoldo v. Castro Ruz, 821 F.3d 196, 206 (1st Cit. 2016).
Id. at 203.
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States," the decree was a sovereign-and not commercial-act whose
validity cannot be questioned in a United States court.44
And in two other cases, district courts accepted that they could not inquire
into the validity of a foreign expropriation, yet found they could adjudicate
related acts taken in the United States: a foreign state's compliance with the
by-laws of the company whose shares it had expropriated,45 in one; and in
the other, allegations of fraudulent conveyance in the United States to avoid
the consequences of an international arbitration concerning the alleged
expropriation.46

C.

FOREIGN

CRImiNAL

ALLEGATIONS

In Ates v. Gulen, plaintiffs alleged that certain Turkish officials conspired
to persecute them by planting evidence, fabricating search warrants, securing
illegal wiretaps, and arresting and detaining them without lawful basis.47
The district court dismissed in part on act of state grounds, finding that
adjudicating the claims risked inquiry into the legal validity of the alleged
conspirators' conduct as well as of the subsequent actions of the Turkish
government to indict them.48
V.

International Discovery

A.

OBTAINING UNITED STATES

DISCOVERY

FOR USE INh

FOREIGN

PROCEEDINGS

In 2016, several United States courts considered whether to order
discovery for use in proceedings before foreign or international tribunals,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) and Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices,
Inc.49 While many courts granted discovery requests,so a similar number
rejected them, citing, among other factors, the burdensome nature of the
request,51 the foreign tribunal's opposition to U.S. judicial assistance,52 and
44. Fed. Treasury Enter. Sojuzplodoimport v. Spirits Int'l B.V., 809 F.3d 737, 744 (2d Cir.
2016).
45. Petersen Energia Inversora, S.A.U. v. Argentine Republic, 2016 WL 4735367, at *7-8
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2016).
46. Crystallex International Corp. v. Petr6leo de Venezuela, S.A., 2016 WL 5724777, at *9-10
(D. Del. Sept. 30, 2016).
47. Ates v. Gulen, No. 3:15-CV-2354, 2016 WL 3568190, at *1 (M.D. Pa. June 29, 2016).
48. Id. at *16.
49. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 256-66 (2004).
50. See, e.g., In re Michael Kors, LLC, No. 2:15-cv-1978 (CCC) (BC), 2016 WL 4472950
(D.N.J. Aug. 23, 2016); In re Porsche Automobil Holding SE, No. 15-mc-417 (LAK), 2016 WL
702327 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2016).
51. Andover Healthcare, Inc. v. 3M Co., 817 F.3d 621, 623-24 (8th Cir. 2016); In re Global
Energy Horizons Corp., 647 F. App'x 83, 86-87 (3d Cit. 2016).
52. In re Qualcomm Inc., 162 F. Supp. 3d 1029, 1040, 42 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
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the requesting party's failure to exhaust discovery-related remedies in the
foreign tribunal53
In a 2016 decision notable for its expansive view of the geographic scope
of § 1782(a), the Eleventh Circuit, in Sergeeva v. Tripleton International
Limited, upheld an order requiring an Atlanta-based company to produce
documents maintained by its Bahamian affiliate.54 In so holding, the
Eleventh Circuit rejected the company's argument that it should not be
required to produce documents located outside of the United States; in the
court's view, based on the plain language of § 1782(a) and the significant
discretion afforded district courts thereunder, the "location of responsive
documents and electronically stored information . .. does not establish a per
se bar to discovery."55

B.

OBTAINING DISCOVERY FROM ABROAD FOR USE IN

U.S.

PROCEEDINGS

In 2016, several United States courts also considered whether to order the
production of discovery abroad for use in United States proceedings.
Among them was the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
which declined to require two foreign, non-party banks with small branch
offices in Chicago to search for and produce information from their overseas
entities, reasoning based on DaimlerAG v. Bauman,56 that it lacked personal
jurisdiction over the banks, and that comity concerns militated against
requiring them to comply with the plaintiffs "broad discovery requests."5
Wielding its judicial power less reservedly, the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, in a case arising out of the alleged
53. In re Elvis Presley Enters. LLC, No. 15mc386 (DLC), 2016 WL 843380, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 1, 2016).
54. Sergeeva v. Tripleton Int'l Ltd., 834 F.3d 1194 (1lth Cir. 2016).
55. Id. at 1200. Three federal appellate courts, in cases pre-dating Sergeeva, suggested in dicta
that § 1782 does not permit the production of documents located abroad. See Kestrel Coal Pty.

Ltd. v. Joy Global, Inc., 362 F.3d 401, 404 (7th Cir. 2004) (quoting commentary from one of
the principal drafters of the statute that § 1782 "was not intended to enable litigants to obtain in
Spain evidence located in Spain that could not be obtained through proceedings in Spain");

Four Pillars Enters. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 308 F.3d 1075, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2002)
(stating there is "some support" for the view that § 1782 does not "encompass[] the discovery
of material located in foreign countries" and affirming the denial of discovery of overseas

materials); In re Sarrio, S.A., 119 F.3d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 1997) (observing that while § 1782 does
not, "[o]n its face ... limit its discovery power to documents located in the United States," the
legislative history suggests that "Congress intended to reach only evidence located" here). Most
district courts have adopted this view. See In re Certain Funds, Accounts, and/or Inv. Vehicles

Managed by Affiliates of Fortress Inv. Grp. LLC, No. 14 Civ. 1801 (NRB), 2014 WL 3404955,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2014) ("In examining a party's request to conduct discovery for use in a
foreign proceeding, courts have read into § 1782 a threshold requirement that the material
sought be located in the United States."); but see In re Gemeinschaftspraxis, No. M19-88 (BSJ),

2006 WL 3844464, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2006) (declining to impose such a requirement).
56. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
57. Leibovitch v. Iran, No. 08 C 1939, 2016 WL 2977273, at *6-17 (N.D. Ill. May 19, 2016).
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manipulation of London interbank offer rates for yen, ordered multiple bank
defendants to produce documents received from and delivered to UK
regulators, notwithstanding a regulator's objection and the fact that
disclosure would risk violating the UK data privacy law.58

VI.

A.

Extraterritorial Application of United States Law

RICO

In RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that the substantive prohibitions of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(b)(c), apply extraterritorially, but only if foreign conduct violates a predicate
offense that itself is intended to apply extraterritorially.59 Applying the
framework of Morrison v. National Australia Bank. Ltd.60 and Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co.,61 the Court found "a clear indication" that RICO
applies extraterritorially, thereby rebutting the extraterritoriality
presumption. Even though RICO does not contain "an express statement of
extraterritoriality," Congress "has defined 'racketeering activity' . . . to

encompass violations of predicate statutes that do expressly apply
extraterritoriality," making RICO "the rare statute that clearly evidences
extraterritorial effect despite lacking an express statement of
extraterritoriality."62
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Second Circuit's holding that
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), RICO's private right of action, permits suits premised
on injuries that occurred abroad.63 The Court held that the
extraterritoriality presumption must be applied separately to RICO's private
right of action, and concluded that section 1964(c) lacked "a clear indication
that Congress intended to create a private right of action for injuries suffered
outside of the United States."64 Thus, a private RICO plaintiff "must allege
and prove a domestic injury to its business or property."65
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, dissented in part,
and would have held that RICO's private right of action does not contain a
domestic injury requirement.66 Justice Breyer also wrote separately, arguing
against deference to the United States Government's view that allowing civil
RICO actions for foreign injuries may cause international friction.67
58. Laydon v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., No. 12 Civ. 3419 (GBD) (HBP), 2016 WL 1718387, at
*2-15 & n.17 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2016).
59. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101-02 (2016).
60. Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
61. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
62. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2102-03.
63. Id. at 2106. Last year's Year in Review discussed the Second Circuit's decision.
64. Id. at 2106-11.
65. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2106.
66. Id. at 2112-13 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67. Id. at 2116-17 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

https://scholar.smu.edu/yearinreview/vol51/iss1/11

10

Page et al.: International Litigation
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION

2017]

B.

169

FOURTH AND FITH AMENDMENTS

The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hernandez v.
Mesa, a case where a Mexican teenager, standing on the Mexican side of the
United States-Mexico border, was shot and killed by a United States Border
Patrol agent standing on the United States side.68 In the en banc decision
below, the United States Court of Appels for the Fifth Circuit held that the
plaintiff could not assert a claim under the Fourth Amendment and the
agent was entitled to qualified immunity.69 The Court added a question to
the grant of certiorari-likely inspired by the United States government's
amicus brief-requiring the parties to brief whether Bivens v. Six Unknown
Federal Narcotics Agents7o would even permit the claim at issue.7'
C.

STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT

Applying RJR Nabisco, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that Congress did not intend the warrant provisions of the
Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq., to apply
extraterritorially, thus quashing a government warrant seeking customer email content stored at Microsoft's datacenter in Ireland.72 The court relied
heavily on the fact that the SCA's focus was on protecting a user's privacy in
stored communications.73

D.

ANTITRUST

As noted above, in In re Vitamin C Antirust Litigation, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed an antitrust suit against
Chinese manufacturers and California-based sellers alleging a price and
supply-fixing conspiracy where the Chinese Government filed an amicus
brief asserting that Chinese law compelled the defendants' actions.74 The
Second Circuit held that it should defer to the foreign government's
representation concerning "the construction and effect of its laws and
regulations," and that principles of international comity justified abstention
from exercising jurisdiction.75
68. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 291 (2016).
69. Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d 117, 119-21 (5th Cir. 2015) (analyzed in last year's
Year in Review).
70. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
71. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 291.
72. In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft

Corp., 829 F.3d 197, 211-21 (2d Cir. 2016).
73. Id. at 216-20, 231-33 (Lynch,

J.,

concurring in the judgment). In a separate concurrence,

Judge Lynch called on Congress to update the SCA.
74. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2016).
75. Id. at 188-94.

Published by SMU Scholar, 2017

11

The Year in Review, Vol. 51, No. 1 [2017], Art. 11
170

E.

THE YEAR IN REVIEW

[VOL. 51

TRADEMARK
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Addressing the reach of the Lanham Act, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed that Morrison extraterritoriality is a
merits question, not a question of federal courts' subject-matter
jurisdiction.76 The court of appeals then applied RJR Nabisco and its own
precedent of Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of American National Trust
Savings Association77 to hold that the Lanham Act applied extraterritorially
where a Canadian retailer was purchasing United States trademarked
grocery products and reselling them without authorization in Canada,
potentially causing reputational harm.78
VII.

Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments

In United States courts, the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards, otherwise
known as the "New York Convention," governs the recognition and
enforcement of most foreign arbitral awards.79 State law, however, governs
the recognition and enforcement of foreign court judgments.

A.

FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS

In CorporacionMexicana De Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. De C. V v.
Pemex-Exploracion Y Produccidn, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that a district court did not abuse its discretion by
confirming an arbitral award nullified by a foreign judgment at the seat of
the arbitration where that foreign judgment was found to be contrary to
United States public policy.so During an arbitration between the petitioner
COMMISA and PEP, an instrumentality of the Mexican government, the
Mexican Congress enacted a statute making clear that Mexican law did not
permit arbitration for the types of administrative claims brought by
COMMISA.s' After the arbitral tribunal issued an award in COMMISA's
favor, the Mexican analog of the D.C. Court of Appeals held that PEP's
actions were not subject to arbitration and therefore annulled the award.82
76. TraderJoe's Co. v. Hallatt, 835 F.3d 960, 966-69 (9th Cir. 2016).
77. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
78. Trader Joe's Co. v. Hallatt, 835 F.3d 960, 969-75 (9th Cir. 2016).
79. The Convention is implemented in U.S. law through Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration
Act ("FAA"). See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign

Arbitration Awards, Art. 21,June 10, 1958, U.S.T. 2517; 9 U.S.C. § 201-08 (2013). The InterAmerican Convention on International Commercial Arbitration governs the recognition and
enforcement of awards if a majority of the parties to an arbitration agreement are citizens of
states that have ratified it. The Inter-American Convention is implemented in Chapter 3 of the

FAA. See 9 U.S.C. § 301-307 (2013).
80. Corporaci6n

Mexicana

De

Mantenimiento

Integral,

S.

De

R.L.

De

C.V.

v.

Pemex-Exploraci6n Y Producci6n, 832 F.3d 92, 97 (2d Cir. 2016).
81. Id. at 99, 108-09.
82. Id.

https://scholar.smu.edu/yearinreview/vol51/iss1/11

12

Page et al.: International Litigation
INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION

2017]

171

The district court refused to grant comity to the Mexican judgment and the
Second Circuit affirmed, ruling that the Mexican judgment "violated basic
notions of justice" by, in the United States court's eyes, retroactively
disrupting contractual expectations in favor of a state enterprise and leaving
COMMISA without a remedy, although the Mexican court, as a matter of
Mexican law, had found no retroactivity.83
In GSS Group Ltd. v. National Port Authority of Liberia, the United States
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that subject matter jurisdiction
could not be exercised over Liberia to confirm an arbitral award under an
agency theory in which Liberia ordered its Port Authority to cancel a
construction contract. 84 Although the wholly state-owned corporation had
no discretion to ignore Liberia's order, the court found that Liberia was
exercising its authority as a regulator, rather than a shareholder, as the Port
Authority had entered into the contract without the competitive bidding
required by state contract procurement procedures.85
In Human v. Czech Republic-Ministry of Health, the United States Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit addressed whether subject matter
jurisdiction existed to enforce an arbitral award against the Czech Republic
arising from an agreement to supply medical technology and services in
exchange for a share of processed blood plasma.86 The court found the
Czech Republic was not entitled to sovereign immunity under the FSIA's
arbitration exception because its relationship with the claimant was a legal,
although not necessarily a contractual, relationship that "may be governed"
by an international agreement, namely the New York Convention.87 The
FAA's additional requirement that the legal relationship be "considered as
commercial" for purpose of enforcement in the United States of Convention
awards was satisfied because, despite the lack of monetary payment under
the parties' relationship, there was clearly an exchange of valuable
commodities.88

B.

FOREiGN COURT JUDGMENTS

In Chevron Corporationv. Donziger, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed an order enjoining enforcement of defendants'
foreign court judgment anywhere in the United States and imposing a
constructive trust on any property acquired by Donziger and two
Ecuadorian defendants anywhere in the world traceable to the judgment.89
Affirming the district court's findings that defendants had obtained their
$8.646 billion judgment by, among other things, bribing the Ecuadorian
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 100, 107-08.
GSS Grp. Ltd. v. Nat'1 Port Auth. of Liberia, 822 F.3d 598, 606 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
Id.
Human v. Czech Republic-Ministry of Health, 824 F.3d 131,133-34 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
Id. at 135-36 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6)).
Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 201).
Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 833 F.3d 74, 80-81 (2d Cir. 2016).
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judge who issued it and ghostwriting his decision, the district court exercised
its equitable powers under New York common law to grant the judgment
debtor relief from a judgment procured by fraud.90 The court rejected the
argument that New York's Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments
Recognition Act, which authorizes defensive but not affirmative challenges
to the validity of a foreign judgment, supplanted Chevron's common-law
cause of action.9] Nor did the district court order offend international
comity, as it exercised power only over individuals subject to the court's
jurisdiction, was limited to the United States, and did not invalidate the
foreign judgment itself, so that other judgment creditors not before the
court were free to continue to seek to enforcement in other countries.92
VIII.

A.

Forum Non Conveniens

FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES

In Atlantic Marine Construction Company, Inc. v. United States District Court,
the United States Supreme Court held that a valid forum-selection clause
mandating a foreign forum usually requires dismissal for forum non
conveniens, except in the unusual instance when the public interest factors
outweigh the forum-selection clause.93 Two years later, courts continue to
define the boundaries of Atlantic Marine. In one case, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit defined the standards that apply to
different aspects of the Atlantic Marine inquiry, and in another decision, it
identified, without deciding, an important conflict-of-laws issue that could
impact future disputes.
In Weber v. PACTXPP Techs., AG, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit defined the different bodies of law that apply to the
interpretation versus the enforceability of a forum selection clause, and also
adopted a mixed standard of review for the Atlantic Marine analysis.94 The
case arose from an employment contract between a CEO and a German
company. The contract provided that the CEO was entitled to proceeds
earned in patent litigation and contained a forum selection clause electing
Germany as the proper forum.95 The dispute followed a jury verdict in favor
of PACT in a patent suit, an event that might have given rise to a substantial
payday for the plaintiff CEO.96 After the verdict but before the judgment
was entered, the company voted the CEO out of office.97 The CEO sued
the company for breach of contract, quantum meruit, and promissory
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 117-19.
Id. at 140-43.
Id. at 143-45.
Ad. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Texas, 134 S. Ct. 568 (2013).
Weber v. PACT XPP Techs., AG, 811 F.3d 758, 768 (5th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 763.
Id.
Id. at 763-764
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estoppel.98 The company moved to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds,
arguing that Germany was the proper forum. The district court disrnissed.99
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit identified two distinct issues related to the
forum-selection clause: one issue involved the legal interpretation of the
clause and the other issue involved its enforceability. The court held that
while the interpretation of the clause in a diversity case is governed by the
forum state's choice-of-law rules, the enforceability of the clause is governed
by federal law.oo The court also held that it would review both
interpretation and enforceability of forum-selection clauses de novo, and
would review the court's application of the forum non conveniens balancing
test for abuse of discretion. It ultimately affirmed the district court's
dismissal.01
Subsequently, in Barnettv. DynCorp International, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court's dismissal for forum
non conveniens due to a foreign forum-selection clause while leaving
unresolved the issue of what law applies to determine whether a forumselection clause is valid in the first place-that is, whether under the Weber
framework just discussed, validity is a matter of interpretation or
enforceability.102 The dispute arose from an employment agreement
between an employee and a Texas-based company containing a forumselection clause electing Kuwait as the proper forum.03 After the company
terminated the employee and promised to pay his benefits and unpaid wages,
the employee sued in federal court in Texas, alleging that he never received
The district court granted the company's motion to
those benefits.-0
dismiss for forum non conveniens over the employee's objections that the
forum-selection clause was void under Texas law and unenforceable under
federal law.105 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit noted that contractual validity
was not at issue in Atlantic Marine and that neither the Fifth Circuit nor the
Supreme Court had specified what source of law governs validity of a forumselection clause.106 The employee argued that validity is a matter of
substantive contract law and should thus be decided under Texas law, while
the company argued that validity is really a matter of enforceability, and
therefore was governed by federal law.107 The Fifth Circuit found support
for both positions, but determined that it need not decide the issue because
98. After the CEO filed suit, PACT filed the civil law equivalent of a declaratory judgment
action in Germany, requesting a declaration that the compensation agreement was invalid under
German law because it had not been ratified by PACT's shareholders. Id. at 764.
99. Id. at 766.
100. Id. at 770.
101. Id. at 768, 775-76.
102. Barnett v. DynCorp Int'l, L.L.C., 831 F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 2016).
103. Id. at 299.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 301.
106. Id. at 301.
107. Id. at 301-02.
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dismissal was proper under both Texas and federal law.1os The question thus
continues to exist as a gap exists in post-Atlantic Marine jurisprudence.
IX.

A.

Parallel Proceedings
INTERNATIONAL ABSTENTION

Federal courts continue to apply the general policy that "[a]bstention from
exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule."109 In Custom
Polymers PET, LLC v. Gamma Meccanica SPA, the court rejected the
defendant's motion to stay parallel court proceedings in Italy, concluding
that the comity analysis favored exercising jurisdiction and proceeding with
the suit."o Although the defendant's Italian lawsuit preceded the plaintiffs
suit, the other factors-such as the forum selection clause and the location of
witnesses-weighed against abstention."'
Similarly, district courts in the Second Circuit confirmed that a court
should decline to exercise jurisdiction only in exceptional circumstances. In
Schenker A.G. v. Societe Air France, the district court refused to stay or
dismiss a German freight forwarder's antitrust action against several airlines
despite a pending Dutch action.'12 The court first observed that the parties
in the two actions were different, so abstention would leave claims against
certain defendants unresolved for a long time.113 The court next reasoned
that the general preference for deferring to the initially filed action does not
apply when that action seeks declaratory relief in response to a direct threat
of litigation.14 In C.D.S. Inc. v. Zetler,"15 the district court refused to abstain
in deference to a proceeding in French court where the parties were not
French companies, the connection with France was weak, and French law
did not govern."1 6 The court concluded it would be inappropriate for a
French court to decide U.S. copyright law issues and resolve United States
law violations between parties that conduct business primarily within the
United States.' '7 Indeed, even where foreign law applied, as in In re Atari,
Inc.,118 the bankruptcy court refused to abstain in favor of a French court
because the dispute concerned the interpretation and enforcement of the
bankruptcy court's own confirmation order.19
108. Id. at 302-303.
109. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976).
110. Custom Polymers PET, LLC v. Gamma Meccanica SpA, 185 F. Supp. 3d 741, 29-30
(D.S.C. 2016), appeal dismissed (Sept. 22, 2016).
111. Id. at 756-57.
112. Schenker A.G. v. Societe Air Fr., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50422 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2016).
113. Id. at *6.
114. Id. at *8.
115. C.D.S. Inc. v. Zetler, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104318 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2016).
116. Id. at *18.
117. Id. at *16.
118. In re Atari, Inc., No. 13-10176, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 1779 (U.S. Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20,
2016).
119. Id. at *45-46.
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The Seventh Circuit in Deb v. Sirva, Inc. distinguished the abstention
doctrine from forum non convenien.120 The court of appeals noted that
abstention "conserve[s] judicial resources by abstaining from accepting
jurisdiction when there is a parallel proceeding elsewhere," whereas the
forum non conveniens determination considers "the adequacy of the forum
along with a balancing of the [parties'] interests."21
B.

Ari-SUIT INJUNCTIONS

Federal circuits remain split in their approach to enjoining foreign
litigation. In BAE Systems Technology Solution & Services v. Republic of Korea's
Defense Acquisition Program Administration,22 the district court enjoined the

defendants from taking any action in Korea, after analyzing both the factors
governing both preliminary injunctions and anti-suit injunctions under
Fourth Circuit standards,123 but limited the injunction's duration in light of
jurisdictional concerns, potential comity, and national security implications,
and urged the parties to agree to stay the Korean action.124 In contrast,
courts in the Ninth Circuit have followed a more liberal approach, which
does not require a likelihood of success on the merits to obtain an anti-suit
injunction. For example, in Tahaya MISR Inv., Inc. v. Helwan Cement S.A.E.,
the district court enjoined an Egyptian action as a violation of the parties'
forum selection clause after considering only whether the two suits involved
the same parties, the possible frustration of the forum's policy, and the
25
impact on comity.1

The Second Circuit considered a request for an anti-suit injunction in a
context involving novel questions of bankruptcy law, maritime law, and the
federal interpleader statute. In Hapag -Lloyd Aktiengesellschaft v. United
States Oil Trading LLC, after finding subject-matter and in rem jurisdiction,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a
district court may enter a foreign anti-suit injunction under the federal
interpleader injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2361.126 The court explained
that "while the statute itself has no extraterritorial reach, federal courts have
long possessed the inherent power to restrain the parties before them from
engaging in suits in foreign jurisdictions."]27

The Second Circuit then

120. Deb v. SIRVA, Inc., 832 F.3d 800, 814-15 (7th Cir. 2016).
12 1. Id.
122. BAE Sys. Tech. Solution & Servs. v. Republic of Korea's Def. Acquisition Program
Admin., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94028 (D. Md. July 19, 2016).
123. Id. at *6-9, *16, *53.
124. Id. at *52-53.
125. Tahaya MISR Inv., Inc. v. Helwan Cement S.A.E., No. 2:16-cv-01001-CAS(AFMx), 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98888 at *7-18 (C.D. Cal. July 27, 2016).
126. See Hapag-Lloyd Aktiengesellschaft v. U.S. Oil Trading LLC, 814 F.3d 146, 154 (2d Cir.
2016).
127. Id. (citing China Trade Dev. Corp. v. M.V. Choong Yong, 837 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1987)).
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remanded the case to the district court for a proper analysis regarding the
injunction's scope.1 28

128. Id. at 155.
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